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Abstract 
 
We examine the cleansing effect of financial crises via their contribution to the exit of 
inefficient US commercial banks from 1984 to 2013. We find a larger increase in the exit 
likelihood of less efficient banks as compared to more efficient banks in the years of the 
Savings and Loans Crisis but not during the Global Financial Crisis. We highlight how the 
magnitude of the shock of the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent, broad government 
interventions might explain these different results. Furthermore, we highlight that both crisis 
periods have a disproportionate effect on young banks regardless of their efficiency levels and 
that they do not generate any positive spillover effects on surviving banks in the three years 
post-crises in spite of some reallocation benefits in favor of new entry banks. Our findings 
highlight that forms of prudential regulation designed to strengthen bank resilience in good 
times might contribute to mitigating the effects of crisis on the longer-term productivity of the 
banking industry. 
 
JEL classification: G21, G28. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies highlight the large costs of financial crises in terms of financial instability 
and the decline of economic growth (Boyson et al., 2014; Brunnermeier, 2009; Dell’ Ariccia 
et al., 2008; Flannery et al., 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). While these costs are 
indisputable, more controversial is the possibility that some benefits might arise from these 
crises in terms of the exit of less productive firms (Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013; 
Knott and Posen, 2005). The proponents of these benefits see crises as a selection process that 
accelerates the removal of the least productive firms with an overall positive effect at the 
industry level (Bresnahan and Raff, 1991; Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013; Petrosky-
Nadeau, 2013). This argument is formalized in the cleansing view of real and financial shocks, 
dating back to Schumpeter (1939) and his concept of creative destruction. 
In this paper we evaluate whether the cleansing view applies to the exit of US commercial 
banks during the major episodes of financial crisis that occurred between 1984 and 2013.  
Understanding whether or not there is a cleansing effect in the banking industry during 
financial crises has important implications for regulators and policy makers. For instance, in 
the absence of a cleansing effect, government policies intended to reduce the short-term impact 
of crises are not in conflict with the longer-term objective of maximizing the productivity of 
the banking industry (Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013).  
The literature does not investigate the cleansing effect of financial crises in the banking 
industry but focuses on non-financial firms with conflicting findings. A first group of studies, 
looking at economic recessions (Bresnahan and Raff, 1991; Caballero and Hammour, 1994), 
offers support to the cleansing view and concludes that firms that do not keep up with 
innovations eventually fail. A second group of studies (Casacuberta and Gandelman, 2012; 
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013; Nishimura et al., 2005), by examining financial shocks, 
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shows that financial crises destroy firms, regardless of their degree of productivity, and lead to 
a scarring effect (see Barlevy, 2002, 2003; Blalock et al., 2008; Ouyang, 2009, for a related 
argument). An exception to this conclusion is contained in Berton et al. (2018), who study 
firms in an Italian region during the period 2008-2012. 
Our analysis departs in two key respects from the existing studies on non-financial firms. 
First, we examine and compare the exit of commercial banks during two major crises – the 
Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis of the mid-eighties and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2007-2010. These crises show key differences in terms of exit. While the number of 
commercial banks that failed during the S&L crisis was greater than during the GFC, the latter 
crisis involved a much larger proportion of failed bank deposits. This is in line with the widely 
accepted view that the GFC is the most severe systemic shock that has hit the banking industry 
since the Great Depression (Altunbas et al., 2017; Brunnermeier, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 
2010). Therefore, analyzing the two crises with different features allows us to understand 
whether it is possible to reach general guidelines on crisis management in banking.  
Second, we account for two bank exit mechanisms: failure and acquisition. The 
consideration of acquisitions is critical in any study of bank exit, as weak banks are more likely 
to be acquisition targets (Focarelli et al., 2002; Hannan and Pilloff, 2009; Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, regulators often favor the take-over of troubled institutions by 
healthier ones, especially during periods of distress, to contain the spread of panic (Berger et 
al, 1999). Hence, ignoring acquisition as an exit mechanism of unproductive banks might result 
in misleading conclusions in terms of bank exit via failure (DeYoung, 2003).  
To identify the least productive banks, we follow a strand of the literature that examines the 
effects of bank productivity (measured in terms of efficiency) on bank exit without a specific 
focus on crisis periods (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Focarelli et al., 2002; Hermalin and Wallace, 
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1994; Knott and Posen, 2005; Koetter and Poghosyan, 2010; Luo, 2003; Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000). Accordingly, we measure bank productivity using cost efficiency, thus quantifying how 
effectively resources are used to produce bank outputs. 
We test the interacting effect of crisis periods and bank efficiency on bank exit using a 
multinomial logistic regression as in DeYoung (2003). We find that the S&L crisis accelerates 
the removal of the least efficient institutions via both exit mechanisms, as suggested by the 
cleansing view. In contrast, the GFC increased the probability of failure of all banks, regardless 
of their levels of efficiency and favored the acquisition of banks with the highest degrees of 
efficiency. Our results are similar in settings that reduce endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, 
the cleansing effect that materializes during the S&L crisis disappears in the group of young 
banks; whereas the findings for the GFC remain consistent with a general scarring effect and 
independently of bank age. This indicates that crises might overly penalize young institutions 
that do not fully achieve their potential (Nishimura et al., 2005; Ouyang 2009). 
We next examine two potential, but not mutually exclusive, explanations for the differences 
we observe across the two crises. First, it is likely that more widespread crises, such as the 
GFC, affect healthier and more productive institutions by generating panic amongst 
uninformed depositors (Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Chen, 1999; Iyer and Puri, 2012; 
Saunders and Wilson, 1996) or by amplifying contagion risk via the interbank market 
(Dasgupta, 2004). In line with this interpretation, we document that when the magnitude of a 
systemic shock is larger, the average efficiency of exit banks is also higher. Second, the GFC 
was characterized by a widespread government intervention via the TARP and the Capital 
Purchase Program that might have contributed to sheltering some inefficient banks from exit 
(Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). Along these lines, we document that supported banks were 
less efficient than other surviving banks pre-crisis. 
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Following our analysis of the explanations for the differences across the two crises, we 
examine broader effects of the two crisis periods. First, focusing on the crisis effects on the 
market share of survived banks, we find that only the S&L crisis negatively affected the market 
share of the least efficient institutions. Second, for acquiring institutions that might have 
benefitted from cheap deals during periods of systemic distress, we show a deterioration of 
acquiring bank efficiency levels post-acquisition.  
In a final step, we examine whether there are post-crisis industry benefits to surviving and 
new entry firms due to the resources released from the failing institutions, as suggested by the 
cleansing view. We do not find any support for this conjecture and show instead that bank 
efficiency after the two crises remained significantly below the respective pre-crisis levels. 
Nevertheless, we do find some evidence that new entry banks during crisis periods benefit from 
efficiency gains post-crises. 
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of regulatory requirements that strengthen 
banks in good times, in anticipation of future systemic distress. These rules play a role in 
safeguarding the long-term productivity of the banking industry.  
Our study adds to the general literature on bank failures in crisis periods (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013; Berger et al., 2012; Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Jin et 
al., 2011). In general, differently from our analysis, and with the exception of Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), these studies draw evidence only for periods of systemic distress and this 
does not allow for any differential effect as compared to normal times to be tested. Furthermore, 
we complement studies on the nexus between bank risk and efficiency, which conclude that 
inefficient banks are generally riskier (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) and 
are more likely to exit the market (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Focarelli et al., 2002; Hermalin and 
Wallace, 1994; Knott and Posen, 2005; Koetter and Poghosyan, 2010; Luo, 2003; Wheelock 
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and Wilson, 2000). However, these studies do not clarify if the exit of inefficient banks is more 
likely to happen in crisis times than in normal times.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the methodology. Section 
3 presents the results of the effect of bank efficiency on bank exit during crisis and normal 
times. Section 4 examines additional effects of the crises and section 5 draws conclusions.   
2. Sample, Definition of Financial Crises and Methodology  
2.1. Sample 
We obtain quarterly data for the population of US commercial banks for the period 1984:Q2 
- 2013:Q4 from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income. More precisely, the data 
for the period before 1993:Q1 are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, while the data 
for the period after 1993:Q1 are from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
The list provided by the FDIC (https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html) 
is then used to identify failed banks (Liu and Ngo, 2014). In this list, failed institutions are 
categorized into two broad groups: 1) banks whose charter is terminated; 2) banks whose 
charter survives.1 Next, we use the data on structural changes provided by the FDIC 
(https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/fdic-institution-directory-id-insured-insitution-download-
file) to identify banks that are acquired during the sample period. Specifically, acquired banks 
are those banks that are absorbed by another institution without government intervention. 
 
 
1 The first group consists of banks that cease to exist and their assets are auctioned off. The second group includes 
banks that were re-privatised (a management takeover followed by a sale, not dependent on whether there was 
assistance for the takeover) or subject to an assisted transaction (either an open assistance transaction or the 
assistance was provided to an acquiring institution). For a full definition of failure and assistance transactions, 
visit http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp#BF1TT.  
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To form our final data sample, we proceed as follows. First, we form a consistent time series 
on the basis of the data manual provided by Den Haan et al. (2002) and we remove observations 
where we identify a clear reporting error or with missing values.2 Second, as explained in 
Section 3, we chose a two-quarter lag for the explanatory variables to reduce potential 
endogeneity problems in the econometric analysis. As a consequence, we lose the failures and 
the acquisitions that occur in the first two quarters of the sample period.  
By applying the criteria described above, we obtain a final sample of 1,058,275 quarterly 
observations belonging to 18,120 unique commercial banks (of which 1,905 are failed banks, 
and 10,069 are acquired banks) between 1984:Q2 and 2013:Q4. To conduct our tests we 
construct a categorical variable (Exit) that is 0 for surviving banks over the sample period, 1 
for banks that failed in a given quarter and 2 for acquired banks in a given quarter. 
2.2. The identification of financial crises  
Critical to our analysis is the identification of periods of financial crises affecting the US 
banking industry. While the literature offers several alternatives on how to identify crisis 
episodes (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Boyson et al., 2014), we follow Liu and Ngo (2014) 
and focus on two major periods of financial crisis: the period between 1986 and 1992 
characterized by the S&L crisis and the period 2007-2010 characterized by the GFC (Liu and 
 
 
2 One of the issues related to using quarterly Call Report Data is the impact of the regulatory changes on the 
construction of aggregate entries in the Call Reports. Some of the definitions of the components of the 
consolidated entries are not consistent throughout our sample period and some entries are newly introduced after 
the beginning of the same period. The data manual by Den Haan, et al. (2002) offers solutions on how to overcome 
these issues and construct consistent data series and provides guidance on how to deal with negative entries in the 
Call Report. Specifically, if there are negative entries in the Call Report, and these entries do not belong to the 
several exceptions that are allowed to be negative, it is a clear reporting error (Den Haan, et al., 2002). 
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Ngo. 2014). We identify each period with a dummy variable that we employ in our empirical 
tests. 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the quarterly bank failure and acquisition rates - expressed 
as percentages of the total number of banks in a quarter - throughout the sample period. Two 
key findings emerge from this Figure. First, bank failures clearly cluster in the two crisis 
periods. Second, there is an upward trend in acquisition rates until the late 1990s, which is 
consistent with the consolidation wave that occurred in this period in the US (Berger et al., 
1999). A downward trend in acquisition rates can, however, be seen in the second crisis period.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
While Figure 1 shows the total number of bank failures to be greater during the S&L crisis 
than during the GFC, a different picture emerges in Figure 2. Here we compare the value of 
deposits that exit banks hold expressed as a percentage of the total value of deposits in the 
market in a given quarter. This Figure shows that the share of deposits that failed banks hold 
during the GFC was larger than during the S&L crisis. This is consistent with the widely 
accepted view that the GFC was the most harmful period of systemic distress since the Great 
Depression (see, for instance, Altunbas et al., 2017; Brunnermeier, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 
2010). The value of the deposits of acquisitions, however, more closely resembles the pattern 
of acquisition rates in Figure 1. Specifically, value of the deposits of acquisitions is lower 
during the GFC as compared to the S&L crisis (with the exception of 2010) and is more 
pronounced during normal times. 
In general, our definition of financial crises reflects periods of high bank exit especially via 
failure. Furthermore, while the number of failures appears higher during the S&L crisis than 
during the GFC, we offer evidence confirming that this latter crisis had a much more 
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pronounced impact on US commercial banks. In fact, the two crises occur in periods with 
significant differences in the structure of the US banking industry, with a much larger number 
of banks operating during the S&L crisis and with a significantly larger average bank size in 
the latest part of our sample period.3 
2.3. The estimation of bank efficiency 
As in Alam (2001), Curi et al. (2015), González (2009) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999) 
we employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate the efficiency of banks.4 DEA is 
part of the non-parametric approaches that the literature proposes to estimate firm efficiency. 
Such approaches do not use a specific function to define a constant relationship between the 
inputs and outputs used by banks to estimate efficiency. This is particularly important as it is 
widely believed that banks do not operate using a specific “well defined production function” 
(Holod and Lewis, 2011). 
The major concern about non-parametric techniques is that they do not take into account the 
existence of a random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, the study of Ruggiero 
(2007) suggests that the distributional assumption for the random error in parametric 
techniques undermines the potential advantages of these techniques over DEA.  
We use an input-oriented Variable Return to Scale (VRS) DEA model to measure the cost 
efficiency of banks. Our measure of efficiency, therefore, reflects a bank’s ability to effectively 
 
 
3 Specifically, on average, 12,246 banks with average total assets equal to US$ 168m (in real terms) operated in 
a quarter during the S&L crisis. In contrast, during the GFC the average number of banks operating in a quarter 
dropped to 6,794 with nearly a tenfold increase in the average total assets to approximately US$ 1.5bn. 
4 DEA is also frequently used in non-banking studies. For instance, Demerjian et al. (2012) employ DEA to 
quantify non-financial firm efficiency and then extract an indicator of managerial ability, while Leverty and Grace 
(2012) focus on the property-liability insurance industry. 
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utilize resources for a given level of outputs. In general terms, DEA models assign efficiency 
scores for the entities (i.e. banks), formally known as Decision Making Units (DMUs), starting 
from the maximization of the ratio between outputs and inputs by varying the weights of the 
inputs and outputs used within each set of DMUs. In our analysis we identify the sets of DMUs 
by size groups of banks and separately for each quarter.5 The estimation by size allows us to 
control for differences in bank technology depending on bank production scale (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2012), while the estimation by quarter removes concerns over a potential forward-
looking bias in the estimation process. Essentially, the aim is to avoid measuring bank 
efficiency in a given quarter by using accounting information that is available only in future 
quarters. An efficient frontier in a set of banks is then formed from the most efficient banks, 
and the VRS approach allows us to include in the efficient frontier banks with different returns 
to scale. Finally, other banks are compared to those that form the efficient frontier and relative 
efficiency scores are assigned - where the distance from the efficient frontier reflects the 
resources a bank has wasted. 
Critical to the estimation process of bank cost efficiency is the choice of bank inputs and 
outputs. As in the majority of the studies documented in Berger and Humphrey (1997) and later 
analyses (see Vander Vennet, 2002), we use the intermediation approach to describe the bank 
production process. Therefore, we employ total deposits, premises and fixed assets, and the 
number of employees as inputs. The related input prices are the interest paid on deposits scaled 
by total deposits, expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total premises and fixed 
assets, and salaries and employee benefits, scaled by the number of employees, respectively. 
 
 
5 We use the following five categories of bank size: very small (less than $50 million in assets), small (between 
$50 and $100 million in assets), medium (between $100 and $500 million in assets), large (between $500 million 
and $1 billion in assets) and very large (over $1 billion in assets). 
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Bank outputs include total securities and total gross loans and leases. The Online Appendix 
provides summary statistics for inputs, input prices and outputs by size group.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for bank efficiencies (and the crisis 
dummies). The average cost efficiency is 45.58%, which is lower than reported in other US 
based studies (see, for instance, Aly et al., 1990; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Our estimates, 
however, focus on the cross-sectional dimension of bank efficiency to remove forward looking 
bias and on a significantly larger number of banks with relatively fewer banks forming an 
efficient frontier. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
2.4. Multinomial logistic regression for bank exits 
As in DeYoung (2003) we employ a multinomial logistic regression model for estimating 
the probabilities of a bank exiting the market via the different exit mechanisms of failure or 
acquisition6. Our dependent variable is Exit, as defined in section 2.1, while our key 
explanatory variables are bank efficiency (CE), S&L crisis, GFC and their interactions (see 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013, for a similar setting). The multinomial logit model, therefore, 
assumes the following form: 
Prob(Exit=i for i=0,1,2)=F(a1CEt−2+a2S&L crisis+a3GFC+a4CEt−2*S&L crisis+a5CEt−2*GFC+ 
bX+Year Dummies+Quarter of Year Dummies) 
(1) 
 
 
6 Our choice of using a multinomial logistic regression, as opposed to a competing risk survival model, is based 
on two main reasons. First, we cannot safely assume that failures and acquisitions are always competing events. 
In particular, although a failure event precludes the occurrence of the other, we do not know which banks would 
have failed if not acquired (distress acquisitions). Therefore, the joint determination of the two events does not 
appear appropriate in our setting. Second, and more importantly, the proportionality assumption in competing 
risks models sets the hazards proportionately over time. Hence, the effects of the covariates are assumed to be 
fixed over time (Box-Steffensmeier, 2004). While in our setting, the proportional-hazard assumption is violated 
for the majority of the covariates, including the main explanatory variables, it is also goes against the main 
hypotheses we aim to test. 
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where F(.) is the logistic distribution and X is a vector of control variables reported in Panel 
B of Table 1. This specification, estimated by clustering the standard errors at the bank level, 
allows us to evaluate how the effect of crisis varies given different levels of bank efficiency 
and how the effect of efficiency on bank exit differs across normal times, the S&L crisis and 
the GFC. Nevertheless, as the sign and magnitude of the interaction terms are not informative 
in non-linear models (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), we use marginal effects to interpret our 
results.  
The vector of controls includes bank-specific characteristics and State-specific 
characteristics. Following Liu and Ngo (2014), the group of bank characteristics consists of 
bank ROA (net income to total assets), Size (the natural logarithm of bank assets measured in 
constant US dollars at 2009 prices), Capital (total equity divided by total assets), NPL (the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans), and M_Share (a bank’s assets to total state banks’ 
assets). As in Wheelock and Wilson (2000) we control for a bank focusing on lending via the 
ratio of loans to assets (Loans). Furthermore, we include two dummy variables – Young and 
Adolescent to control for bank age that, following Berger et al. (2001), is equal to one for 
banks operating for less than 6 years in the industry and between 6 and 20 years, respectively. 
Similar to Cole and White (2012), we have no a priori expectations on how bank size 
impacts on exit via failure or acquisition. Liu and Ngo (2014) find a lower probability to fail 
in large US banks, reflecting the fact that large banks have a more diversified investment 
opportunity set. In contrast, Jin et al. (2011), in an analysis based on the global crisis, find an 
opposite result and suggest that larger banks are more likely to engage in riskier lending and 
securitization. As for the impact of bank size on the probability that a bank is acquired, larger 
institutions may be more difficult to integrate with the acquiring firm’s business and as such 
are less likely to be acquired (Hernando et al., 2009). However, acquirers seeking economies 
of scale may be more likely to acquire larger firms (Hernando et al., 2009).  
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Higher ROA, higher capital ratios and lower non-performing loans should decrease a bank’s 
probability of failure (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole and White, 2012). The relationship 
between these variables and the probability of a bank being acquired is, however, less clear. 
Worse performing banks (namely, banks with lower ROA and capital ratios and higher levels 
of non-performing loans) being closer to a distress condition, may be more likely acquisition 
targets (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Nevertheless, the findings 
in Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) and Hannan and Rhoades (1987) do not support this view. 
A high bank market share could reflect the presence of a too-big-to-fail status and thus 
reduce the probability of failure (Liu and Ngo, 2014), but there is evidence of a higher 
likelihood of failure associated with this variable (driven by the inclusion of government-
assisted banks in the group of failed banks). In terms of acquisition likelihood, banks with 
larger market shares are more likely to be acquisition targets as they significantly contribute to 
expanding the market position of the acquiring institution (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987).  
Goddard et al. (2014) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) show that Loans are positively 
related to the failure probability because a higher value indicates less liquid and more risky 
assets in a bank’s balance sheet. Following Goddard et al. (2014), however, we do not have a 
clear prediction on the relation between Loans and the acquisition likelihood, as their findings 
show that the relationship is dependent on the size of the target bank.7 In terms of bank age, 
there is a widespread view that young banks are more likely to fail or be acquired (DeYoung, 
 
 
7 Specifically, Goddard et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between the loans to assets ratio and the likelihood 
of being acquired for small banks; whereas for the largest banks, a higher loans to assets ratio is found to increase 
the probability of being acquired. 
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2003; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Young and Adolescent banks should then show a greater 
failure likelihood than is the case for mature banks (which represent the omitted category). 
The quarterly state unemployment rate and the quarterly change in aggregate state economic 
activity (∆Coincident Index) control for the economic cycle, as in Khan and Ozel (2016). 
Better local economic conditions should reduce the likelihood of bank failures and might also 
favor expansionary strategies by banks thus increasing acquisition activities. Nevertheless, 
better economic conditions might also positively impact on the performance of potential 
targets, making the acquisitions relatively more costly for the bidders and thus discouraging 
them.  
Finally, we include time fixed effects using year dummies and control for potential 
seasonality effects with quarter of the year dummies Q1 (Q2/Q3), taking a value of 1 for every 
observation that falls under the first (second/third) quarter of a given year. 
3. Empirical Results on Bank Exit 
3.1. Is the exit of less efficient banks more frequent during financial crises? 
The cleansing view of financial crises requires that crisis periods facilitate the removal of 
less efficient banks as compared to normal times. This section presents a simplified analysis of 
the differences in bank exits in normal, S&L crisis and GFC periods by the degree of bank 
efficiency. This analysis offers a rationale for the multivariate tests discussed in the following 
sections. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
More precisely, we focus on the average degree of cost efficiency that the banks in our 
sample show during normal times and calculate the number of bank exits and the exit rates by 
failure and acquisition in normal periods and during the two crisis periods separately for two 
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groups of banks.8 The first group includes banks with a degree of average efficiency (computed 
in normal times) below the sample median in normal times and the second group comprises 
the remaining sampled banks. Our purpose is to test in which group bank exit is more likely 
and whether there is any difference between normal periods, the S&L crisis and the GFC in 
each group. 
Table 2 reports the results of this analysis. We find that the proportion of banks that fail 
increases from 1.39% to 5.12% (1.99%) in the group of the less efficient banks when we move 
from normal to the S&L crisis (GFC). In the group of the more efficient banks we find an 
increase from 0.83% to 1.94% (1.74%). All the increases we observe moving from normal to 
crisis periods are significant at customary levels (according to a z-test of proportion equality). 
Furthermore, as shown in the last row of Table 2, both in normal times and in the S&L crisis 
less efficient banks are more likely to exit via failure. 
A different result emerges, however, for the GFC, for which the failure rates of more and 
less efficient banks do not differ. Finally, column (6) – where the failure rates between the two 
crises are compared – shows that a higher proportion of failures is evident for the S&L crisis 
period when less efficient banks are compared, whereas there is no difference in the failure 
rates in the group of more efficient banks. Taken together these results indicate that, as 
compared to normal times, crises lead to a general increase in bank failures. However, while 
this increase is more pronounced in the group of less efficient banks during the S&L crisis (in 
 
 
8 The exit rates are calculated using the number of failed/acquired banks in normal times/S&L crisis/GFC and 
expressed as a ratio of the total number of banks in the corresponding time period. 170 failed (208 acquired) banks 
are removed from this analysis due to the absence of data in normal times. 
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line with the cleansing effect of crises), there is no evidence of any significant difference in the 
failure rates between the two groups of banks in terms of efficiency during the GFC. 
In terms of bank exit via acquisitions, we find a substantially different picture as compared 
to bank exit via failure. Moving from normal times to the two crisis periods, we find a 
significant decrease in exit rates both in the group of the least and most efficient banks, with a 
greater difference observed for the GFC. Furthermore, we also find that the exit rates for the 
least and most efficient banks differ significantly in normal times but not during either of the 
crisis periods. In general, it does not seem that when bank exit is defined in terms of 
acquisitions, financial crises overly penalize the least efficient banks. 
Overall, this section offers some preliminary evidence of a potential cleansing effect 
produced by the S&L crisis (but not by the GFC) at least when bank exit is defined in terms of 
failure. In contrast, the findings for the GFC seem to be aligned with a scarring effect whereby 
crises exercise a similar effect on efficient and inefficient banks. 
3.2. The impact of the S&L crisis and the GFC on bank exit by degree of bank efficiency 
We next evaluate whether financial crises accelerate the exit of the most inefficient banks 
under a multivariate setting based on equation (1) estimated via a multinomial logit regression. 
The key variables include CE, S&L crisis, GFC and their interactions and the base outcome is 
bank survival to which we compare other exit mechanisms. As the interpretation of interaction 
terms in a multinomial logit model cannot be based on the sign, magnitude or significance 
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levels of the reported coefficients (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), we focus our discussion on 
the marginal effects that we report in Table 3.9 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We start by examining how the S&L crisis and the GFC impact on the probability of bank 
exit when banks show different levels of cost efficiency. Essentially, we compute the marginal 
effects of the variables S&L crisis and GFC on bank exit by fixing cost efficiency at the first 
three quartiles of the sample distribution. This setting allows us to examine the possibility that 
the materialization of a cleansing/scarring effect in the banking industry in periods of distress 
depends on the type of financial crisis that hits the banking industry. Inspection of the marginal 
effects shows that the two crises differ substantially as to how they impact on banks with 
different degrees of cost efficiency.  
As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Panels A and B, we find that the S&L crisis increases 
the probability that the least efficient banks exit the market because of failure (or due to an 
acquisition) significantly more than for the group of the most efficient banks. Although the 
difference between the magnitudes of these effects appears relatively small (as shown in Panel 
B), they do have economic significance. Specifically, given that the likelihood of failure 
(acquisition) in a quarter is 0.18% (0.95%), being in the third rather than the first quartile of 
sample efficiency reduces the probability to fail (be acquired) by 24.67% (8.81%). 
 
 
9 In the interest of brevity we provide the full output of the multinomial logistic regression in the Online 
Appendix. The effects of the control variables are in most cases as expected and in line with prior studies. 
Specifically, we show that banks are less likely to exit the market when their ROA and capitalisation levels are 
higher. A few variables do not have a similar effect on the two exit mechanisms we analyse. Smaller banks, banks 
with higher levels of non-performing loans and higher loan to asset levels are more likely to fail whereas they are 
less likely to be acquired. In addition, while better economic conditions reduce the likelihood of a bank failing 
they increase the chances of acquisition. Furthermore, while none of the age dummies play a significant role in 
terms of bank failure, adolescent banks have a higher likelihood of exiting the market via acquisition. 
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 In the case of the GFC, the results reported in column (3) of Table 3 show that the increase 
in the probability of failure is similar for all levels of bank efficiency. Furthermore, again 
differently from the S&L crisis, the GFC favors an increase in the likelihood that the most 
efficient banks in the industry are acquired (see column (4)).  
Notably, the different effects we observe between the two crises in terms of acquisition 
likelihood are not surprising given that, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US banking 
industry experienced a large wave of consolidation (Berger et al., 1999). Consequently, the 
S&L crisis might have provided further opportunities for relatively healthy and efficient banks 
(that have been less affected by the crisis as shown by our analysis) to take over troubled 
institutions at a cheaper cost.  
In addition, as compared to the S&L crisis, the GFC has a much stronger impact on all banks 
in terms of failure probability and this might have discouraged banks from engaging in 
expansionary strategies in a period of high uncertainty.  
The results reported in columns (5) and (6) of Panel A of Table 3, where we test for equality 
between the marginal effects computed for each of the two crises and for each exit mechanism 
at different levels of efficiency, confirm the validity of the above interpretation. We find that 
the GFC had a significantly greater impact on the exit likelihood via failure than the S&L crisis 
at any level of bank efficiency. For instance, for the banks with a degree of efficiency equal to 
the sample median, the marginal effect of the GFC on the probability of failure is more than 
three times larger than the marginal effect produced by the S&L crisis. Interestingly, when 
considering acquisition as an exit mechanism, we find no difference between the two crises in 
terms of marginal effects for the group consisting of the most efficient banks (namely, for the 
only group significantly affected by the GFC). 
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To recap, our results show that during the S&L crisis, bank exit from the market primarily 
involves the least efficient institutions via both failure and acquisition. In contrast, during the 
GFC, banks fail independently of their level of efficiency, while acquisitions primarily involve 
efficient targets. In short, only bank exits in the period of the S&L crisis conform to the 
cleansing effect, whereas bank exits during the GFC are supportive of a scarring effect where 
a crisis exercises a similar effect on all firms regardless of their efficiency. 
3.3. An alternative comparison of the effects of the S&L crisis and the GFC  
While our empirical setting based on interaction terms eases the analysis of the impact of 
different financial crises on banks with different levels of efficiency, it implicitly assumes that 
all other bank characteristics have a similar effect across different sub-periods. However, this 
assumption is not necessarily plausible. In Panel A of Table 4 we relax this assumption and 
present the results of three multinomial logit models that we estimate separately for three sub-
periods: i) normal periods; ii) the S&L crisis period; and iii) the GFC period.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results in Panel A suggest that bank efficiency plays a significant role in reducing the 
bank probability of exit in normal times and during the S&L crisis. However, it has no 
significant effect during the GFC. The findings for the two crises, therefore, confirm the results 
discussed in the previous section. The sub-period analysis allows us to highlight further 
differences between the three different periods not only in terms of efficiency but also in terms 
of control variables. For instance, in the failure equation we find a negative and significant 
coefficient for bank size only during normal times and the S&L crisis, whereas the size variable 
becomes positive and significant during the GFC. At least in the case of failure, the two crises 
(and also the normal times period) show similar effects for ROA and Capital (that reduce failure 
probabilities), and Loans and NPL (that increase failure probabilities). 
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Next, Panels B and C of Table 4 compare the marginal effects of bank efficiency on bank 
exit in the three periods. The focus on marginal effects is necessary to understand whether the 
impact of efficiency on bank exit is stronger in the S&L crisis than during normal periods, as 
suggested by our earlier analysis. Further, given the limitations that characterize any test for 
differences in the coefficients obtained from different non-linear models (Paternoster et al., 
1998), this type of inference cannot simply rely on the estimated coefficient. We find that the 
marginal effects of cost efficiency are stronger during the S&L crisis than in normal times for 
both exit via failure and acquisition, as indicated by the larger magnitude of the negative 
coefficients of the marginal effect of bank efficiency during the S&L crisis.  
All in all, we again find that the period of the S&L crisis, and not the GFC, accelerated the 
removal of the least efficient banks in the industry as compared to normal times. 
3.4. Controlling for endogeneity  
While we use two-quarter lags of our efficiency measure as an explanatory variable, it might 
still be suggested that our findings suffer from endogeneity. To further rule out the potential 
influence of endogeneity, we conduct three additional tests that we report in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
First, we adopt a similar setting as in Berger and Bouwman (2013) and use average bank 
efficiency values in normal times to predict bank exits during crises. More specifically, to 
conduct this test we proceed as follows. For each normal times period (namely, 1984:Q2-
1985:Q4, 1987:Q1-2006:Q4 and 2011:Q1-2013:Q4) we use the existing 2-quarter-lagged 
efficiency values as predictors of bank exit. For each crisis we employ the average pre-crisis 
cost efficiency values (computed over the four quarters before each crisis erupts) as a predictor 
of exit. Other explanatory variables remain as in the initial models (see Panels A and B). 
Second, we employ the efficiency observed with 3-year (12-quarter) lags as a predictor of bank 
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exit (see Panels C and D). Third, we estimate the model with the average bank efficiency 
computed over a three-quarter period, starting from q-2 and to q-4, as a key explanatory 
variable (see Panels E and F).  
All of these tests show that our results for the two crises remain qualitatively similar. 
3.5. Additional tests: The importance of bank age and other specifications 
In this section we discussion additional tests (reported in the Online Appendix in the interest 
of brevity). Several studies highlight it is necessary to account for firm age when considering 
the cleansing effect of financial crises (see, for instance, Ouyang, 2009). If financial crises 
primarily accelerate the removal of younger unproductive institutions from the market, they 
might favor the exit of firms that have not had sufficient time to exploit their full potential 
(Ouyang, 2009). Therefore, for a cleansing effect to be truly effective the crisis should focus 
primarily on the exit of non-young, unproductive banks. Accordingly, we interact the dummy 
variable Young with the two Crisis dummies and Efficiency and with the cross product between 
the Crisis dummies and Efficiency. As in our earlier tests we report the marginal effects for 
different levels of bank efficiency in the Online Appendix. 
Overall, we find that the cleansing effect assigned to the S&L crisis is not visible in the 
group of young banks and confirm the presence of a general scarring effect during the GFC. 
More generally, however, and in line with Ouyang (2009), both crises have a larger impact on 
the exit probability of young banks at any level of cost efficiency; namely, the two crises overly 
penalize young banks. How these young banks exit the market is, however, different in the two 
crises. The S&L crisis favors primarily an increase in the likelihood that young banks are 
acquired, whereas the GFC increases the failure risk of young banks. 
We next consider alternative measures of bank cost efficiency. In particular, cost efficiency 
can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiencies. The two efficiency measures 
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reflect different managerial skills and/or a bank’s technological advances. Technical efficiency 
measures the ability of a bank to employ the least amount of inputs to produce a certain level 
of output, whereas allocative efficiency measures the ability of selecting the correct input 
choice, given input prices (see, for instance, Farrell, 1957). Therefore, we investigate whether 
we can identify a source of bank cost efficiency that drives our findings on the impact of 
financial crises on bank exit. Our results for both efficiency components remain consistent with 
the analysis based on overall cost efficiency. 
We then employ an alternative econometric approach to estimate cost efficiency by relying 
on a stochastic frontier model (SFA). For the cost function we choose the standard translog 
specification with a truncated-normal error distribution and estimate the model using the same 
set of inputs and outputs and the same estimation approach by size group we followed for DEA. 
As before, the results are consistent with our initial analysis, with the exception of the marginal 
effect of GFC on the most efficient banks, which becomes insignificant. 
In terms of the choice of dummy variables that identify crisis periods, our approach does 
not account for the fact that bank exits originating from financial crises might materialize with 
a lag as compared to the shock period. We, therefore, repeat the analysis by also identifying as 
bank exits due to crises those failures and acquisitions occurring in a four-quarter post-crisis 
period. We do not find any major changes in our results. 
Due to their systemic importance in the economy, large financial institutions are different, 
and their probability of failing is not dependent directly on their performance (see, for instance, 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Berger, et al., 2012; Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 
2013; Liu and Ngo, 2014). As in Berger and Bouwman (2013) we perform additional tests 
excluding the largest banking firms (with real total assets above US $50bn) in each quarter. 
Again, the results remain qualitatively similar. 
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Finally, while we employ a parsimonious model, the literature identifies other variables that 
can affect a bank’s probability of failure and the acquisition likelihood (see Liu and Ngo, 2014). 
We repeat, therefore, the tests by including as additional controls the ratio between non-interest 
income and total operating income and the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets as in 
Chen et al. (2017), asset growth as in DeYoung (2003) and the ratio of total assets held in 
foreign offices to total assets as in Berger et al. (2017). Again, we do not find major changes 
in our results. 
3.6. Why do the results for the two crises differ in terms of exit? 
A key conclusion of our analysis is that efficiency primarily matters for bank exit only 
during the S&L crisis. One possible explanation for this result is related to the differences in 
magnitude between the two crises.  
As shown in Figure 2, during the GFC the share of the banking industry under distress 
conditions was larger as compared to the S&L crisis. The different results we observe could 
then be aligned with the view that widespread crises might affect healthier and more productive 
institutions by generating panic amongst uninformed depositors (see, for instance, Chari and 
Jagannathan, 1988; Chen, 1999; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Saunders and Wilson, 1996). This 
interpretation, therefore, would imply that the GFC had a disproportionate effect on the most 
efficient banks as compared to the other crisis. 
While it is difficult to fully validate the interpretations above, Panel A of Table 6 offers 
evidence on the potential importance of crisis severity for our results. This Table shows the 
degree of efficiency of failed and acquired banks in the crisis periods classified in quartiles 
based on the ratio between exit bank deposits and total deposits. A larger ratio thus indicates a 
larger exit magnitude in the banking system in a crisis period. We find that when we move 
from the first to the fourth quartile of this ratio, the mean (median) efficiency of exit banks tend 
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to increase significantly. Essentially, when the exit is more pronounced, relatively more 
efficient banks are also affected. Notably, unreported tests show that the largest quartile in 
terms of shock magnitude includes periods of both crises; namely, it does not only refer to the 
GFC. Furthermore, we find similar results if we repeat the same analysis separately for the two 
crises. 
The above results do not rule out a further, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
explanation for our findings related to differences in the regulatory setting and responses during 
the two crises that should especially matter for the failure rates. For instance, it has been 
suggested that during the period of the S&L crisis, supervisory oversight was ineffective and 
slow in reacting (FDIC, 1997), with Prompt Corrective Actions being available to the FDIC 
only post the 1991 reform.  In contrast, the GFC was characterized by a large scale and timely 
public intervention to rescue banks and avoid widespread systemic effects. Specifically, the 
implementation of the TARP program from September 2008 gave banks the possibility to 
improve their capital levels via public funds under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and 
the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). As a result, if these regulatory interventions have 
contributed to sheltering inefficient banks from failure, the GFC has resulted in an increase in 
the survival probability of these banks, with a consequent decline in the difference in terms of 
exit (failure) rates between inefficient and efficient banks during this crisis.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) provide some support for this interpretation by showing 
that there was strong self-selection bias in the decision of banks to participate in the CPP. More 
importantly, especially strong banks, namely banks with a strong capital ratio, more stable 
funding profiles, strong asset quality, and operating in better-performing regions opted out of 
the CPP. It appears likely, therefore, that the benefit of the CPP went to relatively weaker banks 
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with plausibly lower levels of efficiency. Along these lines, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) 
also show that some banks declined to receive CPP funds although the U.S. Treasury originally 
approved their applications to the recapitalization program. These banks exhibited higher-
quality assets and operated in better-performing regions than those that finally received capital 
injections. In short, better-performing banks admitted to the program did not see the capital 
injections as beneficial and opted out of the program.  
Panel B of Table 6 offers evidence in line with the above discussion by comparing the 
efficiency of banks that received TARP support directly or indirectly (via their holding 
companies) as compared to the surviving banks in the last quarter before the eruption of the 
global financial crisis10. We find that supported banks were significantly less efficient than 
other banks. In essence, government intervention might have sheltered inefficient banks from 
exit.  
Finally, other differences between the two crises refer to the potential role played by 
monetary policy. Only during the GFC did the Federal Reserve employ, in addition to 
conventional monetary policy tools to lower interest rates and offer liquidity, unconventional 
tools via the adoption of broad quantitative easing programs. These programs benefited bank 
lending and liquidity, and contributed to boosting local economic growth (Luck and 
Zimmerman, 2018; Rodnyansky and Darmouni, 2017). As a result, the extent to which the 
highlighted effects also benefit inefficient banks might explain a decline in their exit rates.   
 
 
10  In our sample we identify117 banks that received TARP support either directly or indirectly (via their parent 
company) with non-missing cost efficiency data. This is equivalent to 5% (14%) of inefficient banks defined as 
banks with cost efficiency less than the first quartile (decile) of the sample distribution before the GFC. Although 
it is an arguably small proportion of banks, had they failed it would have contributed to nearly 20% (26%) of 
inefficient exit banks during the GFC. 
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4. Other Effects of Financial Crises 
4.1. The impact of the S&L crisis and the GFC on surviving banks 
While our primary focus is on bank exit, financial crises might also have a negative impact 
on surviving banks. In this section, we investigate the effect of the two crises in terms of 
changes in market share at the bank level with the purpose to understand if there is any 
differential effect depending on bank efficiency. To this end we estimate fixed effects panel 
data regression models, with standard errors clustered at the bank level, where the dependent 
variables are the changes in a bank’s market share in terms of total assets or total deposits. The 
explanatory variables are those employed in the main analysis and where the two crisis 
dummies are interacted with bank efficiency. We report the regression results in Panel A of 
Table 7, whereas Panel B shows the marginal effects of the two crisis dummies for different 
levels of bank efficiency.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The findings reported in Panel B show that the S&L crisis has a negative effect on bank 
market share for the least efficient banks, whereas we observe no effect on the most efficient 
institutions or even a positive effect when the market share is defined in terms of deposits. The 
GFC, however, has no differential effects on survived banks’ market share depending on 
efficiency. In general, we find that the negative effects of the S&L crisis were primarily 
confined to surviving banks with lower levels of efficiency, while the GFC had no effect on 
surviving banks in terms of their ability to achieve higher market share. 
Furthermore, our empirical strategy offers indications on which banks were more likely to 
be acquisition targets in the two crises but says little on the implications of the deals for the 
acquiring banks. It might be suggested, however, that some benefits accrue to acquiring banks 
because of the opportunity to complete deals under favorable conditions in times of crisis. To 
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assess this possibility, in the Online Appendix we compare the acquiring bank industry-
adjusted average efficiency for the periods before and after the crisis. Specifically, we split the 
sample of acquiring banks into two groups – the ones that acquired in the S&L crisis and the 
ones that acquired in the GFC. We then calculate their average industry-adjusted cost efficiency 
levels for the period before and after the respective crises. The industry adjustment in based on 
the average bank efficiency of all non-acquiring banks in the given state and quarter. This 
adjustment allows us to exclude the influence of general industry trends.  
The results suggest that acquirers’ efficiency relative to their peers deteriorates significantly 
post-crises. This negative effect, however, is more pronounced for the banks that acquired 
during the S&L crisis, which suggests that the scarring effect of the GFC is partly counteracted 
by the benefits to the acquirers stemming from acquiring ‘more efficient’ institutions. 
4.2. Post-crises and bank efficiency: average effects and effects on entry banks 
The literature highlights a number of possible positive implications stemming from the exit 
of inefficient banks. By accelerating the exit of these banks, crises could not only be a cause of 
social and economic costs but also a source of longer-term benefits for the banking industry 
and the whole economy. For instance, the value of the investments of failed banks might be 
captured by surviving banks via spillovers (Knott and Posen, 2005). Furthermore, under the 
cleansing view, since outdated production units become unprofitable and the incentives to 
undertake productivity-improving activities increase, new entry firms should show improved 
levels of innovation and achieve a higher degree of productivity over the longer-term (see Knott 
and Posen, 2005). Other banking studies highlight the benefits for the whole economy from the 
removal of inefficient banks as these banks are detrimental to the real economy due to an 
inherent nexus between the development of the banking sector and economic growth (see, 
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Berger et al., 2004; Bernini and Brighi, 2018; Hasan et al., 2009; Mirzaei and Moore, 
forthcoming). 
Our analysis provides some evidence that a cleansing effect materializes in the banking 
industry but only under some specific scenarios; namely, for one of the two crises and merely 
in the group of older banks. Whether the observed limited cleansing effect is indeed sufficient 
to facilitate an overall long-term improvement in bank efficiency post crisis (as suggested by 
Knott and Posen, 2005) is, therefore, questionable. Furthermore, it is a priori unclear whether 
the observed effects are sufficient to free resources that can facilitate efficiency gains by new 
entry banks. 
In this section we investigate the above aspects by comparing the crisis and post-crisis 
effects on bank efficiency and by examining the “entry effect” of the two crises. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We start by estimating a model where the dependent variable is bank efficiency and that 
includes a similar set of control variables as in the rest of our empirical tests. Two post-crisis 
dummies (Post S&L Crisis and Post GFC), taking a value of one for the 12 quarters post the 
S&L crisis and the GFC, respectively, are our key explanatory variables. Positive values of 
these dummies would indicate efficiency gains post-crisis.  
The results, presented in the first column of Table 8, show that both crisis and post-crisis 
periods are detrimental to bank efficiency: average CE becomes lower not only during the S&L 
crisis and the GFC, but also in the subsequent post-crisis periods. The negative post-crisis 
effects are more pronounced, however, after the GFC than the S&L crisis. More specifically, 
while the S&L post-crisis period has an average negative effect on bank efficiency of 10.276 
percentage points (pp.), the post-GFC exhibits a drop in the average bank efficiency of 24.230 
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pp. This difference is also statistically significant.11 Our results remain similar if we extend the 
post-crisis period (for the S&L crisis) to 5 years. Notably, the results for the GFC do not imply 
that government interventions were worthless for the banking industry. In fact, we cannot 
observe the counterfactual; namely, the GFC effects without these interventions.  
Overall, these results confirm the presence of key differences between the two crises, but, 
regardless of the crisis, bank efficiency does not seem to revert to the pre-crisis levels in the 
three years following the shock. 
Finally, we account for the potential benefits of crises for new entry banks. To this end, we 
define three dummy variables taking the value of one depending on when a new bank entered 
the banking market (namely, during normal times, the S&L crisis and the GFC). We next 
interact the latter two dummies with the post-crisis dummies referring to their entry period.  
The results, reported in column (2) of Table 8 indicate that new entry banks show on average 
greater efficiency than other banks, especially those banks entering during the GFC. 
Furthermore, new entry banks gain in efficiency in the post crisis periods as compared to the 
rest of the sample period.  
All in all, there seem to be some reallocation benefits in favor of new entry banks despite 
the average post-crisis bank efficiency remaining below pre-crisis levels. 
5. Conclusions 
We show that the cleansing effect of financial crises on bank exits is confined to some 
specific scenarios. More specifically, we find that only during the S&L crisis does the systemic 
 
 
11 Specifically, we find that the coefficients are different at the 1% significance level according to an F-test. 
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shock primarily accelerate the exit of the less efficient banks (via both failure and acquisition) 
as required by the cleansing effect. The GFC offers a contrasting picture with banks failing 
regardless of their efficiency levels and the most efficient banks being more likely to be 
acquired than the least efficient institutions. These latter findings are, therefore, in line with the 
scarring view of financial crises, where firms are penalized by financial shocks independently 
of their efficiency.  
Furthermore, additional tests show that the cleansing effect of the S&L crisis did not 
materialize for young banks and both crises overly penalized younger institutions, thus 
reducing the chances that these banks achieved their full potential.  
Given the findings above, it is not surprising, that we find via further tests a significant 
decline in bank efficiency in the three years following the two crises, although we observe 
some benefits for new entry banks. 
Overall, our analysis shows that financial crises do not necessarily produce meaningful 
cleansing effects in the banking industry and are indeed detrimental to the post-crisis 
productivity of the industry. This finding has two key implications.  
First, the purpose of mitigating the short-term effect of systemic shocks does not appear to 
go against the long-term productivity of the banking industry. Second, our finding highlights 
that forms of prudential regulation aimed at strengthening bank resilience in good times, in 
anticipation of future systemic shocks, such as the conservation buffer introduced by Basel III, 
might also contribute to mitigating the effects of crisis on the longer-term productivity of the 
banking industry. This might then benefit economic recovery post-crisis.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Symbol Description N Mean Median St. dev. p1 p99 
Panel A. Crisis dummies and cost efficiency 
S&L crisis 
A dummy equal to 1 for the 
period 1986-1992. 
1,058,275 0.314 0.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
GFC 
A dummy equal to 1 for the 
period 2007-2010. 
1,058,275 0.101 0.000 0.302 0.000 1.000 
CE 
Cost efficiency measured by 
using DEA (%). 
1,058,275 45.581 46.200 19.260 6.100 92.500 
Panel B. Main control variables 
ROA 
Net income divided by bank total 
assets (%).  
1,058,275 0.215 0.261 0.305 -1.398 0.824 
Size 
Log of total assets ($US000s) 
adjusted using an implicit price 
deflator provided by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
1,058,275 11.504 11.367 1.252 9.199 15.555 
Capital 
Total book equity divided by 
total assets (%). 
1,058,275 9.751 9.030 3.282 3.977 22.731 
NPL 
Non-performing loans over total 
loans (%). 
1,058,275 0.978 0.454 1.411 0.000 7.929 
M_Share 
A bank's assets over total 
banking assets in the State where 
the bank is chartered (%). 
1,058,275 0.414 0.113 1.216 0.006 9.767 
Loans 
Total loans and leases divided by 
total assets (%) 
1,058,275 58.108 59.627 15.295 17.951 88.535 
Young 
A dummy variable that equals 1 
if a bank has been operating for 
less than six years. 
1,058,275 0.073 0.000 0.259 0.000 1.000 
Adolescent 
A dummy variable that equals 1 
if a bank has been operating for 
six to twenty years. 
1,058,275 0.152 0.000 0.359 0.000 1.000 
Unemployment 
Seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate by state and 
quarter (%), provided by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. 
1,058,275 5.840 5.500 1.860 2.600 11.300 
∆Coincident 
Index 
An aggregate state economic 
activity measure that matches 
the trend for gross state product, 
provided by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia and 
expressed as a quarterly change 
(%). 
1,058,275 0.641 0.739 0.785 -2.166 2.170 
 
Notes. This Table presents descriptions and summary statistics of the key variables used in this study. Panel A presents the time dummy 
variables used in the empirical analyses and the measure of cost efficiency (CE). The year dummies include S&L crisis and GFC. The 
S&L crisis period represents the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 1992 and the GFC represents the recent global financial crisis 
that occurred in the period between 2007 and 2010. Efficiency values are reported as percentages, and can have values between 0 and 100. 
Panel B presents definitions and summary statistics of the control variables employed in the econometric models: ROA, Size, Capital, 
NPL, M_Share, Loans, Young, Adolescent, Unemployment, and ∆Coincident Index. Variables ROA, Capital, NPL, M_Share, Loans, 
Unemployment and ∆Coincident Index are reported as percentages, Size is reported as the natural log in $US000s, and Young and 
Adolescent are dummy variables. 
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Table 2: Bank Exits by Sub-Periods and Average Cost Efficiency in Normal Times 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Number of failures (scaled by total number of banks) Number of acquisitions (scaled by total number of banks) 
 Normal 
Times 
S&L crisis GFC 
z-stat 
(2)=(1) 
z-stat 
(3)=(1) 
z-stat 
(3)=(2) 
Normal 
Times 
S&L crisis GFC 
z-stat 
(8)=(7) 
z-stat 
(9)=(7) 
z-stat 
(9)=(8) 
A) Below the 
median 
247 
(1.39%) 
770 
(5.12%) 
149 
(1.99%) 
3.73%*** 
(19.41) 
0.60%*** 
(3.49) 
3.13%*** 
(11.20) 
3433 
(19.34%) 
1380 
(9.18%) 
379 
(5.06%) 
10.16%*** 
(25.91) 
14.28%*** 
(28.95) 
4.12%*** 
(10.86) 
B) Above the 
median 
148 
(0.83%) 
291 
(1.94%) 
130 
(1.74%) 
1.10%*** 
(8.65) 
0.90%*** 
(6.27) 
0.20% 
(1.04) 
2965 
(16.70%) 
1305 
(8.68%) 
399 
(5.33%) 
8.02%*** 
(21.51) 
11.38%*** 
(24.30) 
3.35%*** 
(8.97) 
 17752 15037 7492          
A=B (z-stat) 
0.56%*** 
(5.01) 
3.19%*** 
(14.97) 
0.25% 
(1.15) 
   
2.64%*** 
(6.46) 
0.50% 
(1.52) 
0.27% 
(0.74) 
   
 
Notes. This Table presents the distribution of bank failures and acquisitions. The values in Columns (1), (2) and (3) (Columns (7), (8) and (9)) show the total number of failures (acquisitions) in the sample, and the 
proportion of the number of failures (acquisitions) to the total number of banks in the period for banks with average cost efficiency levels below the median (row A) and above the median (row B), separately. The 
median is calculated for all banks in the sample in normal times. The values in Columns (4) to (6) (Columns (10) to (12)) show the differences between the proportions of failures (acquisitions) in each of the crisis 
periods and normal times as well as between the two crises. The test values of the equality tests are provided in parentheses. The last row shows the test-statistics of the equality tests between the proportions of the 
exits for banks with efficiency levels above and below the median. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of the S&L crisis and the GFC on the Probability of Bank Exit at Different Values of Cost Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0888*** 0.3315*** 0.1983*** -0.0493 
8.31*** 23.18***  (4.34) (4.55) (6.19) (-0.91) 
p50 0.0637*** 0.2852*** 0.1915*** 0.0583 
11.05*** 9.14***  (3.39) (4.37) (5.84) (1.07) 
p75 0.0444** 0.2478*** 0.1856*** 0.1542** 
9.88*** 1.25 
 (2.25) (3.88) (4.54) (2.31) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given p75 bank efficiency level   
effect of Crisis given p25 bank efficiency level 
0.0444*** 
(9.45) 
0.0837** 
(4.68) 
0.0127 
(0.13) 
0.2035*** 
(14.27) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of 
the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for periods of savings and 
loans crisis in the period between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for periods of the global financial crisis in the period between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the 
results of marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample cost efficiencies, and the equality tests of the 
marginal S&L and GFC effects at the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panel B presents the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the first quartile 
of sample efficiencies. Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Cost Efficiency on The Probability of Bank Exit: Sub-Period 
Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Normal Times S&L crisis GFC 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Multinomial logistic model results for sub-periods 
CEt-2 -0.006* -0.004*** -0.014*** -0.006*** 0.007 0.001 
 (-1.708) (-5.100) (-6.162) (-4.880) (1.599) (0.657) 
ROA t-2 -1.477*** -0.785*** -0.673*** -0.437*** -1.442*** -0.760*** 
 (-10.581) (-16.547) (-10.442) (-8.116) (-8.981) (-8.675) 
Size t-2 -0.300*** 0.193*** -0.221*** 0.051** 0.287*** 0.127*** 
 (-4.701) (14.404) (-5.089) (2.186) (3.914) (3.280) 
Capital t-2 -0.573*** -0.006 -0.939*** -0.142*** -0.768*** 0.028** 
 (-8.244) (-1.326) (-16.375) (-12.075) (-9.945) (2.422) 
NPL t-2 0.237*** -0.069*** 0.237*** -0.087*** 0.209*** 0.035 
 (7.357) (-4.912) (13.853) (-6.022) (5.905) (0.999) 
M_Share t-2 0.063 -0.008 -0.051 -0.006 -0.095* -0.013 
 (1.049) (-0.785) (-1.069) (-0.306) (-1.659) (-0.434) 
Loans t-2 0.030*** -0.000 0.026*** -0.010*** 0.009* -0.003 
 (5.201) (-0.207) (8.227) (-6.370) (1.662) (-1.234) 
Young -0.219 -0.197*** -0.027 0.254*** 0.510** -0.550*** 
 (-0.988) (-3.132) (-0.305) (3.770) (2.364) (-2.994) 
Adolescent 0.122 0.486*** -0.025 0.418*** -0.005 0.503*** 
 (1.000) (15.327) (-0.349) (8.562) (-0.031) (5.513) 
Unemployment t-2 0.042 -0.040*** 0.120*** 0.003 0.115*** -0.096*** 
 (1.231) (-3.739) (5.726) (0.233) (3.307) (-5.435) 
∆Coincident Index t-2 0.014 0.014 0.062 -0.090*** 0.072 -0.005 
 (0.137) (0.588) (1.082) (-2.907) (1.304) (-0.115) 
Year dummies/ Quarter of 
year dummies 
YES/YES YES/YES YES/YES YES/YES YES/YES YES/YES 
Constant -1.897** -6.547*** 0.156 -2.939*** -6.645*** -5.795*** 
 (-1.963) (-32.654) (0.264) (-8.850) (-5.187) (-10.338) 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.06 0.15 0.17 
Observations 618,883 618,883 332,278 332,278 107,114 107,114 
Panel B. Marginal effects of cost efficiency in different periods (p.p.) 
CE -0.0004* -0.0037*** -0.0043*** -0.0054*** 0.0015 0.0010 
 (-1.69) (-5.09) (-6.04) (-4.80) (1.59) (0.64) 
Panel C. Tests of the equality of the cost efficiency effects on the probability of bank exit between normal times and 
crises 
t value: effect of efficiency during the S&L Crisis = effect of efficiency during normal 
times 
140.00*** 320.00*** 
t value: effect of efficiency during the GFC = effect of efficiency during normal times 105.44*** 758.10*** 
t value: effect of efficiency during the S&L Crisis = effect of efficiency during GFC 84.31*** 697.52*** 
 
Notes. This Table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE) affects banks’ probability of failure and being acquired at different 
time periods. The method employed is a multinomial logistic model and the output is provided in Panel A. The dependent variable, Exit, 
has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank fails, bank is 
acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. CE is measured using DEA and shows banks’ ability to effectively utilize 
resources for a given level of outputs (see Section 2.3 for CE estimation details). Normal times include the quarters when no crisis took 
place (1984:Q2-1985:Q4; 1993:Q1-2006:Q4; 2011:Q1-2013:Q4), the S&L crisis includes the period of the savings and loans crisis 
(1986:Q1-1992:Q4) and the GFC includes the quarters of the global financial crisis (2007:Q1-2010:Q4). Bank-specific controls include 
ROA (the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets), Size (the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and 
in real terms), Capital (the ratio between bank book value of equity and bank total assets), NPL (the ratio between non-performing loans 
and total loans), M_Share (the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered), 
Loans (the ratio between bank total loans and leases and bank total assets), Young (a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, 
and 0 otherwise, where Young is defined as a bank, which has been operating for less than six years) and Adolescent (a dummy variable 
that equals one if a bank is adolescent, and 0 otherwise, where Adolescent is defined as a bank, which has been operating for six to twenty 
years). Macroeconomic controls include Unemployment (the rate of unemployment in the State where the bank is chartered) and 
∆Coincident Index (the percentage change in the coincident index in the State where the bank is chartered). For brevity Year dummies 
and Quarter of year dummies are excluded from the output. All independent variables apart from Young and Adolescent are lagged by 
two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B shows marginal 
CE effects on the bank probability of exit; and Panel C shows equality tests of CE effects between different time periods. Test values are 
provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Additional Tests to Control for Endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of pre-crisis cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0630*** 0.4994*** 0.1539*** -0.0316 5.17** 31.86*** 
 (2.78) (5.61) (4.89) (-0.58)   
p50 0.0435** 0.3336*** 0.1865*** 0.0981* 13.07*** 8.07*** 
 (2.19) (4.61) (5.76) (1.71)   
p75 0.0281 0.2102*** 0.2177*** 0.2182*** 14.35*** 0.01 
 (1.37) (3.12) (4.85) (2.91)   
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of pre-crisis cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given p75 bank efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis given p25 bank efficiency level 
0.0349** 
(4.39) 
0.2892*** 
(26.55) 
0.0638 
(2.26) 
0.2498*** 
(15.48) 
  
Panel C. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of 3-year lag cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.4386*** 0.0336 0.2963*** -0.2110*** 
5.85** 10.67*** 
 (6.76) (0.46) (6.03) (-3.42) 
p50 0.3550*** -0.0145 0.3173*** -0.1130* 
0.48 1.87 
 (6.37) (-0.21) (6.30) (-1.86) 
p75 0.2923 -0.0520 0.3370*** -0.0263 
0.56 0.09 
 (5.75) (-0.76) (5.87) (-0.36) 
Panel D. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of 3-year lag cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given p75 bank efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis given p25 bank efficiency level 
0.1463*** 
(24.78) 
0.0856** 
(4.13) 
0.0407 
 (1.28) 
0.1847*** 
(10.17) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel E. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of average cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0899*** 0.3675*** 0.1697*** -0.1479*** 
4.64** 35.90*** 
 (4.27) (4.40) (5.45) (-2.81) 
p50 0.0706*** 0.2525*** 0.1660*** -0.0368 
7.92*** 14.38*** 
 (3.97) (3.58) (5.84) (-0.70) 
p75 0.0561*** 0.1662** 0.1623*** 0.0614 
7.76*** 1.64 
 (3.23) (2.53) (4.73) (0.95) 
Panel F. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of average cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given p75 bank efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis given p25 bank efficiency level 
0.0338** 
(5.67) 
0.2013*** 
(19.19) 
0.0074 
(0.05) 
0.2093*** 
(14.81) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis, and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of 
the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for periods of savings and 
loans crisis in the period between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for periods of the global financial crisis in the period between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Panels A, C and E 
show the results of marginal S&L and GFC effects on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample cost efficiencies, and the equality tests of 
the marginal S&L and GFC effects at the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panels B, D and F present the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the 
first quartile of sample efficiencies. For the respective multinomial logit models, different alterations of cost efficiency (CE) values are employed: CE reported in Panels A and B is set to an average 4-quarter pre-
crisis value for the respective crisis periods, and the original lagged values are used for normal times. A 3-quarter rolling CE average is reported in Panels C and D. CE in Panels E and F is lagged by 3 years (12 
quarters). Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Exit Magnitude, TARP Support and Bank Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Mean and median failed and acquired bank efficiency at the 25th and 75th percentiles of exit magnitude 
 Failed Bank Efficiency Acquired Bank Efficiency 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
q1 37.64 35.50 40.66 40.10 
     
q4 44.08 44.50 42.11 42.70 
     
Difference 
6.44*** 
(5.16) 
9.00*** 
(5.85) 
1.45** 
(2.47) 
2.60*** 
(2.84) 
Panel B. Mean and median cost efficiency of banks affiliated with TARP support and non-supported banks 
 Mean Median 
Supported Banks 31.59 30.90 
     
Non-Supported Banks 44.08 40.90 
     
Difference 
12.49*** 
(8.09) 
10.00 
(7.40) 
 
Notes. This Table shows the relation between Exit Magnitude, TARP Support and Bank Efficiency. Exit magnitude is computed as the 
ratio between exit bank deposits and the total deposits at the time of the exit. Banks affiliated with TARP support are defined as banks that 
either received TARP support directly or the support was provided for the bank’s parent company. Non-supported banks are defined as the 
remaining banks that do not exit the market. The cost efficiency levels are taken from the last quarter before the GFC, i.e. in 2006:Q4. 
Panel A shows the mean and median failed and acquired bank efficiency for the first (q1) and fourth (q4) quartiles of sample exit 
magnitudes. The differences and equality tests of the mean and median cost efficiencies between the last and the first quartile of sample 
exit magnitudes are provided below. Panel B shows the mean and median cost efficiency levels for banks that received TARP support and 
the non-supported banks. The mean and median differences as well as their corresponding test statistics are provided in the last row. Test 
values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Effects of the S&L and the GFC on the Market Share of Surviving Banks 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A. Results of the fixed effects panel data regression model 
 Market Share by Assets Market Share by Deposits 
CEt-2 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (2.901) (4.015) 
S&L crisis -2.222*** -2.170*** 
 (-26.646) (-25.031) 
GFC 0.084 0.085 
 (0.818) (0.749) 
S&L crisis*CEt-2 0.037*** 0.038*** 
 (26.744) (26.576) 
GFC*CEt-2 -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.687) (0.204) 
Controls/ Year dummies/ Quarter of 
year dummies 
YES/YES/YES YES/YES/YES 
Constant 11.309*** 11.407*** 
 (21.040) (18.767) 
Observations 848,287 848,287 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 
Panel B. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
 S&L crisis GFC S&L crisis GFC 
p25 -1.0683*** 0.0400 -0.9737*** 0.0994* 
 (-20.48) (0.72) (-17.95) (1.72) 
p50 -0.5304*** 0.0195 -0.4158*** 0.1063** 
 (-11.80) (0.40) (-8.88) (2.13) 
p75 -0.0477 0.0010 0.0848* 0.1125* 
 (-1.05) (0.02) (1.78) (1.86) 
Panel C. Tests of the equality between change at the state level market share and real asset growth at first and last 
quartiles of bank efficiency 
effect of Crisis given p75 bank 
efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis given p25 bank 
efficiency level 
1.0206*** 
(715.26) 
0.0390 
(0.47) 
1.0585*** 
(706.31) 
0.0131 
(0.04) 
 
Notes. This Table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), the S&L crisis, and the GFC affect survived banks’ market share 
using fixed effects panel data regression model. The dependent variable in Column (1) (Column (2)) is market share by assets (deposits) 
(MSA (MSD)) and measures a quarterly change in a bank’s market share (bank total assets (deposits) to total bank assets (deposits) in a 
state, where the bank is chartered, and in a given quarter) and expressed in percentages. The independent variable CE is bank cost efficiency, 
calculated using DEA, and expressed in percentages. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for periods of savings and loans crisis in 
the period between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for periods of the global financial crisis in the period 
between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Survived banks are defined as banks that do not exit the market via failure or acquisition in one 
of the three normal times periods (between 1984 and 1985, 1993 and 2006 as well as 2010 and 2013) and the two crisis periods (S&L crisis 
and the GFC). Control variables (Controls) are the ones reported in Panel B of Table 1. Year fixed effects (Year dummies) and Quarter 
of year dummies are included in the model. Panel A shows the results of the regression models and Panel B shows the marginal S&L 
crisis and GFC effects on banks’ change in market share given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample cost 
efficiencies. The differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the first quartile of sample 
efficiencies are presented in Panel C. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Test values are provided in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: Post-Crises and Bank Efficiency 
 (1) (2) 
 Post-Crises Effect on Efficiency Entry Effect 
   
S&L crisis -7.672*** -7.010*** 
 (-36.832) (-33.763) 
GFC -21.605*** -14.364*** 
 (-66.125) (-47.663) 
Post S&L Crisis -10.276*** -11.082*** 
 (-40.843) (-43.236) 
Post GFC -24.230*** -19.634*** 
 (-73.533) (-68.161) 
Entered in NT  7.396*** 
  (18.790) 
Entered in S&L crisis  3.721*** 
  (8.103) 
Entered in GFC  11.015*** 
  (11.108) 
Post S&L crisis*Entered in 
S&L crisis 
 2.671*** 
  (5.376) 
Post GFC*Entered in GFC  2.224*** 
  (2.766) 
Control variables/Year 
dummies/ Quarter of year 
dummies 
YES/YES/YES YES/YES/YES 
Constant 90.132*** 129.679*** 
 (43.043) (103.865) 
R-Squared 0.18 0.26 
Observations 1,046,680 1,046,680 
 
Notes. This Table shows the results of how Post S&L crisis and Post GFC affect bank efficiency. The method employed in Column (1) 
(Column (2)) is a fixed effects panel data (an OLS) regression model. The dependent variable, cost efficiency (CE), is measured using 
DEA and shows banks’ ability to effectively utilize resources for a given level of outputs (see Section 2.3 for CE estimation details). The 
S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for periods of savings and loans crisis in the period between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC 
is a dummy that equals one for periods of the global financial crisis in the period between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Post S&L Crisis 
(Post GFC) is a dummy variable that equals one for the 12-quarter period following the S&L crisis (GFC), and 0 otherwise. Entered in 
NT (Entered in S&L crisis/Entered in GFC) is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank began its operations in Normal Times (S&L 
crisis/GFC), and 0 otherwise. Control variables (Controls) are the ones reported in Panel B of Table 1. Year fixed effects (Year dummies) 
and Quarter of year dummies are included in the model. All independent control variables apart from Young and Adolescent are lagged 
by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Test values are 
provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
  
 44 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Quarterly Bank Exits as a Percentage of Total Banks in the Quarter 
NOTES: This Figure shows the distribution of failed and acquired banks in the sample between 1984 and 2013. The definitions of failed 
and acquired banks have been obtained from the FDIC. Failed bank is defined as a bank that failed or received government assistance in a 
given quarter, and acquired bank is defined as a bank that was acquired without government assistance in a given quarter. The dashed and 
dotted lines show the number of failed and acquired banks in a quarter, respectively, as a percentage of total number of banks in that 
quarter. The shaded areas represent crisis periods and the unshaded areas represent normal times. The crisis periods include the S&L crisis 
in the period between 1986 and 1992 and the GFC that occurred in the period between 2007 and 2010. 
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Figure 2. Yearly Bank Deposits in Exit Banks as a Percentage of Total Bank Deposits in the Sample 
Notes. This Figure shows the distribution of failed and acquired bank deposits as a percentage of total bank deposits in the sample by year 
in the period between 1984 and 2013. The definitions of failed and acquired banks have been obtained from the FDIC. Failed bank is 
defined as a bank that failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and acquired bank is defined as a bank that was acquired 
without government assistance in a given quarter. The black and grey columns show the amount of deposits in failed and acquired banks 
in a year, respectively, as a percentage of total deposits of banks in that year. The shaded areas represent crisis periods and the unshaded 
areas represent normal times. The crisis periods include the S&L crisis in the period between 1986 and 1992 and the GFC that occurred in 
the period between 2007 and 2010. 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used to Estimate Bank Cost Efficiency 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  N Mean Median St. dev. 
Panel A. Very Small Banks 
INPUTS 
Total deposits 300,934 19,466.660 18,999.500 8,392.057 
Premises and fixed assets 300,934 373.553 251.000 398.337 
Number of employees 300,934 12.239 11.000 6.676 
OUTPUTS 
Total securities 300,934 6,540.017 5,586.000 4,638.250 
Loans and leases 300,934 12,132.990 10,995.000 6,865.247 
INPUT PRICES 
Price of deposits 300,934 0.011 0.011 0.027 
Price of premises and fixed assets 300,934 0.147 0.084 0.427 
Price of labor 300,934 8.577 7.571 4.089 
Panel B. Small Banks 
INPUTS 
Total deposits 265,038 48,220.850 46,480.500 13,095.420 
Premises and fixed assets 265,038 1,009.375 784.000 838.531 
Number of employees 265,038 26.179 25.000 13.315 
OUTPUTS 
Total securities 265,038 15,589.860 14,131.500 9,402.423 
Loans and leases 265,038 32,083.460 29,882.000 13,802.790 
INPUT PRICES 
Price of deposits 265,038 0.010 0.010 0.005 
Price of premises and fixed assets 265,038  0.103  0.068  0.343  
Price of labor 265,038  9.338  8.333  4.201  
Panel C. Medium Size Banks 
INPUTS 
Total deposits 375,834 144,285.200 120,474.000 75,615.900 
Premises and fixed assets 375,834 3,190.155 2,403.000 2,761.323 
Number of employees 375,834 68.876 58.000 105.708 
OUTPUTS 
Total securities 375,834 41,518.010 33,534.000 32,298.790 
Loans and leases 375,834 106,866.700 87,057.000 68,334.280 
INPUT PRICES 
Price of deposits 375,834 0.009 0.008 0.008 
Price of premises and fixed assets 375,834 0.095 0.061 0.730 
Price of labor 375,834 10.616 9.548 5.058 
Panel D. Large banks 
INPUTS 
Total deposits 48,958 472,302.900 454,295.000 132,738.700 
Premises and fixed assets 48,958 10,157.640 8,789.000 6,717.901 
Number of employees 48,958 205.037 192.000 112.264 
OUTPUTS 
Total securities 48,958 127,213.600 111,279.000 83,073.310 
Loans and leases 48,958 380,484.300 367,053.500 140,538.500 
INPUT PRICES 
Price of deposits 48,958 0.008 0.007 0.005 
Price of premises and fixed assets 48,958 0.102 0.063 0.477 
Price of labor 48,958 12.176 11.215 6.029 
Panel E. Very Large banks 
INPUTS 
Total deposits 47,924 7,423,095.000 1,380,800.000 42,800,000.000 
Premises and fixed assets 47,924 110,237.000 26,003.500 473,116.000 
Number of employees 47,924 2,332.760 553.000 10,443.900 
OUTPUTS 
Total securities 47,924 1,932,982.000 366,312.000 11,200,000.000 
Loans and leases 47,924 6,347,479.000 1,159,230.000 32,000,000.000 
INPUT PRICES 
Price of deposits 47,924 0.007 0.007 0.005 
Price of premises and fixed assets 47,924 0.783 0.077 69.915 
Price of labor 47,924 13.742 12.197 9.450 
 
Notes. This Table presents summary statistics of inputs, outputs, and input prices used for cost efficiency estimation. The inputs are Total 
deposits, which include demand deposits, money market deposits, other savings deposits, time deposits and deposits in foreign offices; 
Premises and fixed assets, which include bank premises, furniture and fixtures, equipment and other assets representing bank premises 
(including capitalized leases) owned by the institution and Number of employees, which represent the number of full-time employees on 
the payroll of the bank and its subsidiaries at the end of the quarter. The outputs include Total securities that show total investment 
securities, excluding securities held in trading accounts and Total loans and leases that show bank total loans and lease financing 
receivables, including unearned income. Input prices are the Price of deposits, measured by the expenses for total deposits divided by Total 
deposits; the Price of premises and fixed assets measured by the expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by premises and fixed assets 
and the Price of labor, measured by total labor expenses in a quarter divided by the number of employees. The statistics are presented for 
the samples of very small banks (less than $50 million in assets), small banks (between $50 and $100 million in assets), medium size banks 
(between $100 and $500 million in assets), large banks (between $500 million and $1 billion in assets) and very large banks (over $1 
billion in assets) in Panels A, B, C, D and E, respectively. 
 48 
 
 
 Table A2: Bank Exits and the Interaction Between Cost Efficiency and the S&L crisis and the GFC 
 (1) (2) 
 Failure Acquisition 
CEt-2 -0.004 -0.004*** 
 (-0.953) (-6.393) 
S&L crisis 0.888*** 0.361*** 
 (4.069) (4.412) 
GFC 1.088*** -0.312*** 
 (4.180) (-3.028) 
S&L crisis*CEt-2 -0.009** -0.002 
 (-2.079) (-1.240) 
GFC*CEt-2 0.000 0.008*** 
 (0.053) (3.945) 
ROA t-2 -0.954*** -0.681*** 
 (-16.312) (-20.796) 
Size t-2 -0.147*** 0.158*** 
 (-4.562) (14.333) 
Capital t-2 -0.808*** -0.029*** 
 (-20.455) (-6.692) 
NPL t-2 0.242*** -0.064*** 
 (17.064) (-6.602) 
M_Share t-2 -0.020 -0.004 
 (-0.682) (-0.435) 
Loans t-2 0.023*** -0.003*** 
 (9.558) (-4.215) 
Young 0.026 -0.033 
 (0.338) (-0.744) 
Adolescent 0.016 0.489*** 
 (0.274) (19.287) 
Unemployment t-2 0.099*** -0.035*** 
 (6.549) (-4.743) 
∆Coincident Index t-2 0.044 -0.017 
 (1.277) (-1.015) 
Year dummies/ Quarter of year dummies YES/YES YES/YES 
Constant -2.133*** -5.690*** 
 (-4.175) (-34.501) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.10 
Observations 1,058,275 1,058,275 
 
Notes. This Table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), the S&L crisis and the GFC affect banks’ probability of failure and 
acquisition. The method employed is a multinomial logistic model. The dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, 
respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank 
survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for the period of the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 
1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for the period of the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables include ROA, Size, Capital, NPL, M_Share, Loans, Young, Adolescent, Unemployment and ∆Coincident Index. 
ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars 
and in real terms, Capital is the ratio between the bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL is the ratio between non-performing 
loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the state where the bank is 
chartered, Loans is the ratio between bank total loans and leases and bank total assets, Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank 
is young (defined as a bank which has been operating for less than six years) and 0 otherwise, Adolescent is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a bank is adolescent (defined as a bank which has been operating for six to twenty years), and 0 otherwise,  Unemployment is the 
rate of unemployment in the state where the bank is chartered and ∆Coincident Index is the percentage change in the coincident index in 
the state where the bank is chartered. For brevity Year dummies and Quarter of year dummies are excluded from the output. All 
independent variables apart from Crises, Young and Adolescent are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. All models are 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 
5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A3: Marginal Effects of the S&L and the GFC on the Probability of Bank Exit at Different Values of Cost Efficiency in Young and Non-Young Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Young Banks Non-Young Banks Young Banks Non-Young Banks 
 S&L crisis GFC S&L crisis GFC Test of Equality: S&L crisis=GFC 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisitions 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies and for young and non-young banks (p.p.) 
p25 0.1510** 0.4973*** 0.7204*** -0.1430 0.0801*** 0.3183*** 0.1756*** -0.0430 
10.07*** 15.98*** 7.20*** 20.03*** 
 (2.35) (4.06) (4.10) (-1.13) (4.09) (4.32) (5.80) (-0.77) 
p50 0.1384** 0.4976*** 0.6374*** -0.1075 0.0503*** 0.2653*** 0.1660*** 0.0753 
10.92*** 23.42*** 10.69*** 6.11** 
 (2.18) (5.09) (4.34) (-1.08) (2.89) (4.03) (5.43) (1.32) 
p75 0.1231 0.4979*** 0.5582*** -0.0730 0.0290 0.2229*** 0.1579*** 0.1810** 
7.28*** 16.26 9.57*** 0.23 
 (1.37) (4.39) (3.38) (-0.65) (1.63) (3.47) (4.09) (2.56) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the marginal effects of the S&L crisis and the GFC computed for values of cost efficiency equal to the 75th and 25th percentile of the sample distribution 
 
0.0279 
(0.10) 
0.0006 
(0.00) 
0.1622 
(0.91) 
0.0700 
(0.27) 
0.0511*** 
(13.39) 
0.0954** 
(5.67) 
0.0177 
(0.26) 
0.2240*** 
(15.19) 
    
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects on young and non-young banks’ probability of failure and acquisition at different levels of bank cost efficiency (CE). The dependent variable, Exit, 
has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis 
and GFC are dummy variables that equal one for periods of the S&L crisis and the recent global financial crisis, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects on young and 
non-young banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample cost efficiencies and the equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects at 
the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panel B presents the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the first quartile of sample efficiencies. Test values 
are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A4: Alternative Measures of Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of technical efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0845*** 0.3015*** 0.1973*** -0.0363 
9. 19*** 18.96***  (4.31) (4.29) (6.32) (-0.66) 
p50 0.0611*** 0.2606*** 0.1821*** 0.0362 
10.44*** 9.24***  (3.21) (4.02) (5.73) (0.68) 
p75 0.0437** 0.2299*** 0.1701*** 0.0946 
9.01*** 2.84* 
 (2.15) (3.55) (4.51) (1.53) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentiles of technical efficiency 
effect of Crisis 
given p75 bank 
efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis 
given p25 bank 
efficiency level 
0.0408*** 
(10.16) 
0.0716** 
(3.86) 
0.0272 
(0.82) 
0.1309*** 
(7.39) 
  
Panel C. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of allocative efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0778*** 0.3471*** 0.1897*** -0.0087 
9.00*** 20.98*** 
 (3.83) (4.86) (6.08) (-0.16) 
p50 0.0648*** 0.3019*** 0.2006*** 0.1071* 
12.13*** 6.28*** 
 (3.56) (4.62) (6.04) (1.83) 
p75 0.0580*** 0.2776*** 0.2063*** 0.1755*** 
12.35*** 1.46 
 (3.23) (4.31) (5.57) (2.58) 
Panel D. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentiles of allocative efficiency 
effect of Crisis 
given p75 bank 
efficiency level =  
effect of Crisis 
given p25 bank 
efficiency level 
0.0198* 
(3.74) 
0.0695** 
(5.01) 
0.0166 
(0.52) 
0.1842*** 
(16.67) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The dependent 
variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, bank 
fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for the period 
of the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for the period of the global 
financial crisis between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Panel A (Panel C) shows the results of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects 
on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartiles of the sample technical 
(allocative) efficiencies, and the equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects at the respective quartiles of the technical 
(allocative) efficiencies. Panel B (Panel D) presents the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between 
the last and the first quartile of sample technical (allocative) efficiencies. Technical and allocative efficiencies are the components of the 
cost efficiency measure (see section 2.3 for estimation details) and respectively measure the ability of banks to employ the least amount of 
inputs to produce a certain level of output, and the ability of selecting the correct input choice, given input prices. Test values are provided 
in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A5: Alternative Cost Efficiency Estimation – Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0532*** 0.3434*** 0.1669*** -0.0033 
11.48*** 21.23***  (3.01) (5.01) (5.99) (-0.06) 
p50 0.0423*** 0.2275*** 0.1683*** 0.0225 
14.86*** 7.64***  (2.59) (3.51) (6.08) (0.41) 
p75 0.0365** 0.1619** 0.1689*** 0.0388 
16.74*** 2.60 
 (2.33) (2.56) (6.08) (0.65) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given 
p75 bank efficiency 
level =  
effect of Crisis given 
p25 bank efficiency 
level 
0.0167*** 
(19.60) 
0.1815*** 
(143.54) 
0.0020 
(0.15) 
0.0421 
(1.85) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis, and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The 
dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, 
bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for the 
period of the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for the period of the global 
financial crisis between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the results of marginal the S&L crisis and GFC effects on banks’ 
probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartiles of the sample cost efficiencies, and the 
equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects at the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panel B presents the differences 
and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the first quartiles of sample efficiencies. Cost efficiency 
is estimated using SFA, with the choice of the standard translog specification with a truncated-normal error distribution for the cost 
function. Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A6: Alternative Crisis Periods Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) 
p25 0.0864*** 0.3299*** 0.1937*** -0.0527 
8.46*** 23.45***  (4.41) (4.53) (6.30) (-0.98) 
p50 0.0612*** 0.2859*** 0.1837*** 0.0598 
11.21*** 9.08***  (3.39) (4.38) (5.99) (1.10) 
p75 0.0418** 0.2504*** 0.1751*** 0.1600** 
10.59*** 1.20 
 (2.16) (3.92) (4.76) (2.46) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentile of cost efficiency 
effect of Crisis given 
p75 bank efficiency 
level =  
effect of Crisis given 
p25 bank efficiency 
level 
0.0446*** 
(8.77) 
0.0795** 
(4.21) 
0.0186 
(0.37) 
0.2127*** 
(18.41) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis, and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The 
dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, 
bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for the 
period of the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 1992 as well as the subsequent four quarters, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy 
that equals one for the period of the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2010 as well as the subsequent four quarters, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A shows the results of marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), 
second (p50) and third (p75) quartiles of the sample cost efficiencies, and the equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects at 
the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panel B presents the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC 
effects between the last and the first quartiles of sample efficiencies. Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** 
Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A7: Other Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 S&L crisis GFC  Test of Equality 
 Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition Failure Acquisition 
Panel A. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) – excluding large banks 
p25 0.0898*** 0.3302*** 0.2057*** -0.0530 
9.00*** 23.74***  (4.37) (4.56) (6.32) (-0.98) 
p50 0.0636*** 0.2832*** 0.1841*** 0.0649 
9.93*** 8.42***  (3.38) (4.34) (5.64) (1.18) 
p75 0.0437** 0.2450*** 0.1662*** 0.1720** 
8.19*** 0.74 
 (2.22) (3.83) (4.28) (2.51) 
Panel B. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentiles of cost efficiency - excluding large 
banks 
effect of Crisis 
given p75 bank 
efficiency level 
=  
effect of Crisis 
given p25 bank 
efficiency level 
0.0461*** 
(10.08) 
0.0852** 
(4.90) 
0.0395 
(1.52) 
0.2250*** 
(16.38) 
  
Panel C. Marginal effects of financial crises at different levels of cost efficiencies (p.p.) – additional controls 
p25 0.2490*** 0.2490*** 0.2490*** 0.2490*** 0.2490*** 
(6.65) 
0.2490*** 
(6.65)  (6.65) (6.65) (6.65) (6.65) 
p50 0.2466*** 0.2466*** 0.2466*** 0.2466*** 0.2466*** 
(6.29) 
0.2466*** 
(6.29)  (6.29) (6.29) (6.29) (6.29) 
p75 0.2443*** 0.2443*** 0.2443*** 0.2443*** 
0.2443*** 0.2443*** 
 (5.00) (5.00) (5.00) (5.00) 
Panel D. Tests of the equality of the probability of bank exit between the 75th and 25th percentiles of cost efficiency – additional controls 
effect of Crisis 
given p75 bank 
efficiency level 
=  
effect of Crisis 
given p25 bank 
efficiency level 
0.0426*** 
(7.84) 
0.1045*** 
(6.99) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.2051*** 
(15.68) 
  
 
Notes. This Table shows the marginal effects of the S&L crisis, and the GFC on banks’ probability of failure and acquisition. The 
dependent variable, Exit, has values of 0, 1 or 2, depending, respectively, on one of the potential outcomes in a given quarter: bank survives, 
bank fails, bank is acquired. The base outcome is a bank survives in a given quarter. The S&L crisis is a dummy that equals one for the 
period of the savings and loans crisis between 1986 and 1992, and 0 otherwise. GFC is a dummy that equals one for the period of the global 
financial crisis between 2007 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Panels A and C show the results of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects on 
banks’ probability of failure and acquisition given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartiles of the sample cost efficiencies, 
and the equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects at the respective quartiles of the cost efficiencies. Panels B and D present 
the differences and equality tests of the marginal S&L crisis and GFC effects between the last and the first quartiles of sample efficiencies. 
The initial model (Equation (1)) in Panels A and B is altered to exclude the largest banks (banks with total assets above US $50bn), whereas 
in Panels C and D the model is modified to include the ratio between non-interest income and total operating income, the ratio of non-
interest expenses to total assets, asset growth and the ratio of total assets held in foreign offices to total assets as additional controls. Test 
values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table A8: Acquiring Bank Efficiency 
 (1) (2) 
 S&L Crisis GFC 
Before the crisis 
0.5157 
(1.62) 
-4.0152*** 
(-6.56) 
After the crisis 
-10.6274*** 
(-26.71) 
-7.7121*** 
(-11.86) 
Difference 
-11.1431*** 
(-24.12) 
-3.6969*** 
(-5.62) 
 
Notes. This Table shows acquiring bank industry-adjusted average levels of cost efficiency before and after the S&L crisis (Column (1)), 
and the GFC (Column (2)). The industry adjustment is based on the average bank efficiency in a given quarter and the same state in which 
a given bank is chartered. Acquiring banks are split into two groups, based on when the acquisitions took place, i.e. during the S&L crisis 
or GFC. Banks that acquired in both crisis periods are excluded from the samples as the post-S&L crisis period coincides with the pre-
GFC period. Test values are provided in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1 %. 
 
 
